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Introduction 
 
The problem of revitalizing the nation and bringing up good citizens 
acquired a renewed significance during the interwar years in Britain. In the 
words of David Matless, ‘[d]ebates over an ‘A1’ or ‘C3’ nation went back 
to the eugenic ‘National Efficiency’ drive which followed the revelation of 
poor physical capacity in Boer War recruits’.1 This persistent trope was 
also related to, and frequently informed by, a more general socio-cultural 
climate that involved a complex coexistence and cross-fertilization of 
evolutionary ideas and Nietzschean philosophy. As David Stack explains, 
G. B. Shaw, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Ramsay MacDonald, among 
others, used the ideas of evolution as a caveat to the degenerative drift of 
capitalism and as a bulwark of an organically developing society.2 Just as 
Darwinism preoccupied writers and thinkers across the political spectrum, 
Nietzsche’s impact on the Edwardian and interwar views on degeneration 
was felt, according to Dan Stone, across nationally conscious discourses.3 
Given its contemporary urgency, the problem of national revitalization also 
galvanized H. G. Wells’s utopian imaginings, which were in conversation 
with evolutionary ideas and with the projections of the overman. 
 
As early as ‘Human Evolution, An Artificial Process’ (1896), Wells 
argued that the differences between the natural and the evolved man were 
minimal in terms of evolutionary changes. The more significant 
                                                 
1 David Matless, Landscape and Englishness (London: Reaktion Books, 1998), p. 
91. 
2 David Stack, The First Darwinian Left: Socialism and Darwinism, 1859–1914 
(Cheltenham: New Clarion Press, 2003), pp. 88, 115. 
3 Dan Stone, Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and 
Interwar Britain (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), p. 65. 
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distinctions would consist in the accumulation of ‘moral suggestions and 
knowledge’, which characterized the evolved man.4 Wells’s evolutionary 
perspective on the two types of humanity can be placed in the wider 
context of the literary practice of doubling, which was particularly 
prominent in the fin de siècle. As Linda Dryden demonstrates, ‘horrors 
occurring in the heart of the modern metropolis’ activated the images of 
degenerate souls (in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and R. L. 
Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde) and subterranean 
sweatshops (in Wells’s When the Sleeper Wakes).5 These representations of 
the darker sides of life threw into relief the duality of human nature and 
exposed ‘metropolitan anxieties springing from the lived experiences of the 
late-Victorian public’.6 In utopian fiction, the practice of doubling heralds a 
substantial betterment of mankind, insofar as the horrors of living are 
ironed out not only by social, but also by physical reconstitution. 
 
Indeed, in A Modern Utopia (1905), Wells supplies the contemporary 
Englishman with an evolved, and therefore superhuman, double. While 
visiting Utopia, the main character comes to a realization that his thumb 
marks, collected for the purposes of identification, happen to match the 
personal record of a Utopian. He first deems this coincidence to be a mere 
failure in the Utopian database storing up individual information. Then he 
allows the possibility of ‘a grotesque encounter, as of something happening 
in a looking glass’.7 The protagonist’s anticipated projection of his identity 
into the future permits Harvey Quamen to discern in A Modern Utopia ‘a 
hall of mirrors: Wells resembles, but is not identical to, the Owner of the 
Voice who in turn resembles, but is not identical to, the main character who 
resembles, but is not identical to, his Utopian double.’8 This chain of 
resemblances arguably testifies to an underlying continuity whereby the 
main character ascertains ‘a strange link of essential identity, a sympathy, 
an understanding’ between himself and his Utopian double.9 At the same 
time, the Utopian double is reported to belong to a caste of highly 
                                                 
4 H. G. Wells, ‘Human Evolution, An Artificial Process,’ Fortnightly Review 
60.358 (1896), p. 594. 
5 Linda Dryden, The Modern Gothic and Literary Doubles: Stevenson, Wilde and 
Wells, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 15. 
6 Ibid., p. 188. 
7 H. G. Wells, A Modern Utopia [1905], intro. Mark R. Hillegas, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 229. 
8 Harvey N. Quamen, ‘Unnatural Interbreeding: H. G. Wells’s A Modern Utopia as 
Species and Genre,’ Victorian Literature and Culture 33 (2005), p. 74. 
9 Wells, Utopia, p. 229. 
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accomplished citizens, and is therefore superior to the protagonist: ‘He is a 
little taller than I, younger looking and sounder looking ... His training has 
been subtly finer than mine; he has made himself a better face than mine’.10 
 
The fact that the Utopian double improves on the Englishman’s 
physical and social qualities has further resonances in Wells’s interwar 
utopian fictions. This conception permeates both Men Like Gods (1923) 
and The Shape of Things to Come (1933). In Men Like Gods, the Utopians 
display visible signs of superiority in their longer lifespan, taller build, and 
fairer complexion. In the perception of Mr Barnstaple, the protagonist of 
Men Like Gods, ‘theirs was a cleansed and perfected humanity, and it 
seemed to him that they were gods’.11 Distinctive features are also intrinsic 
to the Utopians’ character, which is noted for ‘cleanliness, truth, candour 
and helpfulness, confidence in the world, fearlessness and a sense of 
belonging to the great purpose of the race’ (MLG, p. 375). The Shape of 
Things to Come charts the progression of the world up until the year 2106, 
from ‘the Age of Frustration’ to ‘the Modern State in control of life’. The 
rise of the Modern State entails the expansion of a regulated education and 
the subsequent proliferation of polymaths, who are eventually replaced by 
what Wells envisages as a new species of man that will live longer and 
more cooperatively.12 From the above brief outline, it follows that the 
assets of the Utopian double are premised on the transformations that 
involve humanity’s appearance, character, and social milieu. 
 
This article examines the ways in which Wells’s conception of the 
Utopian double mediates a response to the nation-wide fears of a 
degenerative drift. In order to comprehend how the contemporary 
emphases on national revitalization filter into the vision of a World State, 
this article reads Wells’s utopian fictions in the context of his other 
writings, which problematize the use of education and eugenics in the 
imagination of a global future. A further question this article addresses is 
one of individuality. If the Utopian double is to bear the hallmarks of a 
superman, to what extent is his character commensurable with existing 
national susceptibilities? 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 247. 
11 H. G. Wells, Men Like Gods [1923], in H. G. Wells: Classic Collection II, 
(London: Gollancz, 2011), p. 372. Hereafter referenced parenthetically as MLG. 
12 H. G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come [1933], (London: Gollancz, 2011), p. 
421. Hereafter referenced parenthetically as STC. 
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1. Education and Eugenics 
 
Among factors contributing to Wells’s conception of the Utopian 
double, education and eugenics acquire a special and frequently conflicted 
prominence. Urthred, one of the characters in Men Like Gods, points to the 
dividing chasm between the mind-sets of the Earthlings and their Utopian 
counterparts, which he attributes to education: 
 
Yours are Age of Confusion minds, trained to conflict, trained 
to insecurity and secret self-seeking. In that fashion Nature and 
your state have taught you to live and so you must needs live 
until you die. Such lessons are to be unlearnt only in ten 
thousand generations, by the slow education of three thousand 
years. (MLG, p. 272) 
 
The growth of a World State is inseparable for Wells from the spread of 
education, which lays the foundation of what he terms in his economic 
study The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind (1931) ‘the universal 
human persona’.13 However, the attainment of such a persona is seriously 
hampered, in Wells’s judgement, by the lamentable state of education, 
when viewed from the vantage point of a fulfilled utopian future. The 
Shape of Things to Come provides the following assessment: not only did 
education in the Age of Frustration indulge in ‘patriotic twaddle’ and keep 
knowledge explicitly outside formal schooling, but there was also 
‘practically no philosophical education at all in the world, no intelligent 
criticism of generalizations and general ideas. There was no science of 
social processes at all’ (STC, p. 82). Such a retrospective diagnosis is fully 
consonant with Wells’s other criticisms of the contemporary system of 
education. In Experiment in Autobiography (1934), Wells comments that 
the 1870 Education Act was meant ‘to educate the lower classes for 
employment on lower-class lines, with specially trained, inferior teachers 
who had no university quality’.14 Whereas Wells as a student of a National 
School had to undergo training mainly in his teacher’s volatile moods and 
deficient professionalism, the protagonist of his ‘condition-of-England’ 
novel The New Machiavelli (1911) is exposed to a schooling in which there 
are always model replies to the same questions. Similarly, the main 
                                                 
13 H. G. Wells, The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind [1931], (London: 
William Heinemann, 1932), p. 718. 
14 H. G. Wells, Experiment in Autobiography: Discoveries and Conclusions of a 
Very Ordinary Brain (since 1866), (London: Victor Gollancz and The Cresset 
Press, 1934), p. 93. 
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character of The History of Mr Polly (1910) bears the brunt of educational 
mismanagement. The imaginary picture of Empire instructing her ‘English 
children’ about ‘their essential nobility and knighthood’ falls short of 
Polly’s long-term expectations. Instead, he is eventually left with the 
compression of his ‘mind and soul in the educational institutions of his 
time’, indigestion and mispronounced words.15 Notably, John Carey 
construes Polly’s lost educational opportunities as ‘Wells’s rage at the 
national expenditure on armaments, which ... has stunted the lives of 
millions of children’.16 But what Carey importantly overlooks is Polly’s 
constant search for a difference that his ordinary life could not provide. 
Undoubtedly, his failed suicidal attempt at his house, as well as his fluke 
heroism at the Potwell Inn, contain an ironic commentary on the lengths to 
which Polly goes in seeking maturity and self-fulfilment. He learns more 
from life than his formal education ever afforded. Much as this statement 
brings the effectiveness of institutional schooling almost to a minimum, it 
throws into relief the protagonist’s inherent receptivity to learning and his 
disposition to change. The penultimate chapter of The History of Mr Polly 
tellingly opens with a line central to Wells’s utopianism: ‘If the world does 
not please you, you can change it’.17 The state of national education in 
England, as Wells depicts it, may be deficient and mismanaged, but the 
first stirrings of the Utopian double are with those who are responsive and 
resolute. 
 
Whereas Polly’s character evolves in a largely idyllic rural England, 
the eponymous protagonists of Joan and Peter: The Story of an Education 
(1918) gain insight into the more valuable qualities of the English character 
in the company of their uncle Oswald Sydenham. The novel is interspersed 
with the latter’s pronouncements about the duality of Britain, which is at 
once badly and properly placed to manifest its genuine character: ‘We have 
an empire as big as the world and an imagination as small as a parish’.18 
The nation’s alleged parochialism is solely assigned to the system of 
education: as in The History of Mr Polly, it comes across as inappropriate. 
It effectively disseminates habits and attitudes of isolation that are 
incongruous with the necessity to maintain a more knowledgeable 
international outreach. As Oswald notes, ‘[t]he habit of detachment was too 
                                                 
15 H. G. Wells, The History of Mr Polly, (London: Thomas Nelson, 1910), p. 23. 
16 John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the 
Literary Intelligentsia, 1880–1939, (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 141. 
17 Wells, Polly, p. 283. 
18 H. G. Wells, Joan and Peter: The Story of an Education, (London: Cassell, 
1918), p. 276. 
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deeply ingrained. Great Britain was an island of onlookers’.19 The 
fundamental sense of isolation to which the novel refers does not seem to 
do sufficient justice to the national system of education, especially before 
the Great War. In a study of English patriotism, Stephen Heathorn observes 
that the ideas about the nation propagated in the classroom ‘were ultimately 
successful enough to induce millions of working-class men and women to 
willingly sacrifice their lives and loved ones to the demands of the nation-
state in the cataclysmic clash of rival nationalisms that erupted in 1914’.20 
This statement sheds some light on the vividly patriotic, if not nationalistic, 
aspect of English education. However, both Heathorn and Wells’s 
mouthpiece in Joan and Peter are reluctant to acknowledge the immediate 
effect that the Great War produced on all those ‘onlookers’ who found 
themselves fighting for England in Belgium and France. Their professed 
sense of isolation would not have taken them far. Growing sensitive to this 
realization towards the end of the novel, Oswald tones down his critique 
and reveals his understanding of the English ideals: 
 
I tell you there is no race and no tradition in the whole world 
that I would change for my English race and tradition. I do not 
mean the brief tradition of this little Buckingham Palace and 
Westminster system here that began yesterday and will end 
tomorrow, I mean the great tradition of the English that is 
spread all over the earth, the tradition of Shakespeare and 
Milton, of Newton and Bacon, of Runnymede and Agincourt, 
the tradition of the men who speak fairly and act fairly, without 
harshness and without fear, who face whatever odds there are 
against them and take no account of Kings.21 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 578. 
20 Stephen Heathorn, For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender, Class, 
and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880–1914, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000), p. 218. 
21 Wells, Joan and Peter, p. 725. 
The mention of Bacon in the company of Shakespeare, Milton and Newton 
immediately brings back the figure of Francis Bacon, the English statesman, 
empirical thinker and essayist. In A Modern Utopia, Wells aligns his vision of 
Utopian science with what Bacon pictured in The New Atlantis (1627) as Saloman’s 
House, a body of scientists obtaining knowledge from all corners of the globe. 
Advocating the continuous growth of science, Wells relates more to Bacon’s 
‘foreshadowings’ than to Morris’s return to nature (Wells, Utopia, p. 100). Besides, 
in articulating Oswald’s views on fairness, Wells might also have in mind Roger 
Bacon, a medieval English philosopher. In his autobiography, Wells paralleled his 
own vocation in life with that of Roger Bacon: ‘I play at being such a man as he 
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Oswald’s confession indicates his fundamental attachments to national 
culture, rather than the political continuity vested in the monarchy and 
parliamentary government. It also brings out the idiom of the English 
character, which is associated with fairness. In his account of Britain’s 
intellectual life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Stefan 
Collini elucidates the discourse of the national character through the notion 
of fair play, typical of organized games such as cricket. Extending the 
principle of fairness to the discourse of character, he contends that, during 
this period, it ‘was an expression of a deeply ingrained perception of the 
qualities needed to cope with life, an ethic with strong roots in areas of 
experience ostensibly remote from politics’.22 Along these lines, Oswald’s 
privileging of fair actions and words points up a quality which is closely 
linked with a wider understanding of the English character. 
 
Wells puts the ideal of fairness to a number of imaginative and highly 
suggestive lengths in his conception of the Utopian double. On proclaiming 
as their motto ‘Our education is our government’ (MLG, p. 254), the 
Utopians have acted consistently in dismissing both politicians and lawyers 
as anachronistic phenomena. Utopia’s revenue from natural resources gets 
fairly distributed in such a way that a child is granted a credit ‘sufficient to 
educate and maintain him up to four- or five-and-twenty, and then he was 
expected to choose some occupation to replenish his account’ (MLG, p. 
382). If one fails to start a job, his or her idleness figures as a psychological 
disorder, not a financial crime; the Earthlings receive a further explanation 
of the Utopian work ethic: ‘It is a pleasant world indeed for holidays, but 
not for those who would continuously do nothing’ (MLG, p. 254). As a 
result, this beautiful and just society is largely secured by its citizens’ 
access to, and acquisition of, professional knowledge, and subsequent 
work. If read in this light, Wells’s vision of a World State/Utopia fully 
outgrows the educational deficiencies of contemporary England, making 
education a central socio-political force. 
 
Alongside education, the nationally conscious ideal of fairness lies at 
the foundation of the Utopians’ attitudes. While briefing the Earthlings 
about the socio-political arrangements in Utopia, Urthred promises: ‘We 
will try our utmost to deal fairly and friendly with you if you will respect 
                                                                                                      
was, a man altogether lonely and immediately futile, a man lit by a vision of a 
world still some centuries ahead, convinced of its reality and urgency, and yet 
powerless to bring it nearer’ (Wells, Experiment, p. 729). 
22 Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in 
Britain, 1850–1930, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 116. 
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our laws and ways’ (MLG, p. 272). This pledge of fair treatment evokes the 
opening scene of Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis (1627). A crew of 
English sailors are equally promised admittance to the island of Bensalem, 
provided that they swear by their Christian faith and own up to not having 
shed blood, either lawfully or otherwise, in the last several weeks. Once 
through this searching interrogation, the company later find themselves in a 
fair city with three fair streets, a fair and spacious house, a fair parlour, 
among ‘men more fair and admirable’.23 The ninefold repetition of the 
epithet ‘fair’, which is used to describe the comely appearance of buildings 
and people, is bounded up with Bensalem’s consistent and moderate 
practices which can also be regarded as being fair. The island’s scientific 
advances render the laws redundant, as everyone abides by ‘the reverence 
of a man’s self, ... the chiefest bridle of all vices’.24 The pun on the word 
‘fair’, implicit in The New Atlantis, thus becomes deliberate in Men Like 
Gods. 
 
However, what complicates the realization of fairness in its two major 
meanings (just and beautiful) is the entanglement of Utopian education 
with eugenic practices, resulting in a pool of fair-looking people. On the 
eve of his forced departure from Utopia, Barnstaple looks back on the 
fairness of the Utopian order and wishes to see it take effect in his space-
time: ‘Earth too would grow rich with loveliness and fair as this great land 
was fair. The sons of Earth also, purified from disease, sweet-minded and 
strong and beautiful, would go proudly about their conquered planet and 
lift their daring to the stars’ (MLG, p. 403). Barnstaple’s anticipations are 
clearly informed by his attention to the Utopians’ physical fairness. Besides 
education, Patrick Parrinder detects in Wells’s utopias ‘an unrecognizable 
physical evolution, brought about by eugenics rather than natural 
selection’.25 Indeed, two times in Men Like Gods, Wells indicates that 
eugenics has begun in Utopia (MLG, pp. 263, 313). Wider applications of 
positive eugenics are signalled in The Shape of Things to Come, again in 
tandem with the educational effort, which is expected to guide man’s 
becoming ‘generation by generation a new species, differing more widely 
from that weedy, tragic, pathetic, cruel, fantastic, absurd and sometimes 
sheerly horrible being who christened himself in a mood of oafish 
arrogance Homo sapiens’ (STC, p. 420). 
                                                 
23 Francis Bacon, New Atlantis [1627], in Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, 
New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines, ed. Susan Bruce, (Oxford: Oxford World’s 
Classics, 1999), pp. 152, 155, 173. 
24 Ibid., p. 174. 
25 Patrick Parrinder, H. G. Wells, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1970), p. 10. 
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Apart from exposure to the educational impact governing Utopia, the 
conception of the Utopian double is derived from the theory and practice of 
eugenics. In Men Like Gods, Barnstaple, overwhelmed by ‘the firm clear 
beauty of face and limb that every Utopian displayed’, learns about the 
limits of eugenics: ‘The Utopians told of eugenic beginnings, of a new and 
surer decision in the choice of parents, of an increasing certainty in the 
science of heredity.’ (MLG, p. 263). Wells takes eugenic policies much 
further in his later vision of a World State conjured up in The Shape of 
Things to Come: ‘[T]his painless destruction of monsters and the more 
dreadful and pitiful sorts of defective was legalized, and also the 
sterilization of various types that would otherwise have transmitted 
tendencies that were painfully undesirable’ (STC, p. 388). The disturbing 
aspect of these policies is prompted by the historical context in which they 
were proposed. Before and during the Great War, when Britain was again 
faced with anxieties about the nation’s mental and physical decline, 
eugenic ideas continued to emerge in the mainstream of the political 
agenda. In his critical examination Eugenics and Other Evils (1917), G. K. 
Chesterton labelled the initiatives to legalize sterilization as the advent of 
the Eugenic State: ‘The first of the Eugenic Laws has already been adopted 
by the Government of this country; and passed with the applause of both 
parties through the dominant House of Parliament’.26 Here Chesterton 
refers back to the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act, which defined three 
categories of mental defective (‘idiot’, ‘imbecile’ and ‘feeble-minded’) and 
prescribed institutional detention, not sterilization, of people with relevant 
handicaps. Chesterton apprehended that England was likely to tread down 
the path of eugenics and arrive at what Hilaire Belloc called ‘the Servile 
State’.27 In Chesterton’s words, England ‘has almost certainly missed the 
Socialist State. But we are already under the Eugenist State; and nothing 
remains to us but rebellion’.28 Interestingly, after this outspoken response 
to the reputed flowering of eugenics in England, there was only one major 
parliamentary campaign to legalize voluntary sterilization in 1931, which 
had not garnered sufficient support. According to Desmond King and 
Randall Hansen, ‘[t]he request, which was portrayed by its opponents as 
                                                 
26 G. K. Chesterton, Eugenics and Other Evils [1917], (London: Cassell, 1922), p. 
19. 
27 Hilaire Belloc, An Examination of Socialism, (London: Catholic Trust Society, 
1908), p. 5. 
28 Chesterton, p. 21. 
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fundamentally anti-working class, was defeated by 167 votes to 89’.29 In 
this context, Wells’s intermittent advocacy of both positive and negative 
eugenic methods appears to be more marginal than it would have been 
during the earlier decades of the twentieth century. 
 
The publication of The Shape of Things to Come coincided with the 
adoption of the Eugenic Law in Germany in 1933. Initially imposing 
sterilization in the case of mental illness, genetic malformations, and 
alcoholism, the Law culminated in the 1935 ‘Act for the Protection of 
German Blood and German Honour’.30 In the estimation of Peter Weingart, 
who has investigated the attempts to rationalize human evolution in 
Germany, the aforesaid Act ‘reflected the unholy combination of eugenic 
thinking and Germanic race doctrines which under the Nazis had 
crystallized into a government-sponsored anti-Semitism’.31 However, what 
matters is not only a temporal coincidence with Wells’s eugenic concerns, 
but that these concerns had a long history of their own. In Anticipations 
(1901), for example, Wells gives voice to his understanding of the Jewish 
question: ‘If the Jew has a certain incurable tendency to social parasitism, 
and we make social parasitism impossible, we shall abolish the Jew, and if 
he has not, there is no need to abolish the Jew’.32 The ambiguity of such 
considerations is connected with the verb ‘to abolish’, which suggests 
extermination. But given Wells’s insistence on the coalescence of identities 
into a cosmopolitanism, ‘to abolish’ may mean to re-educate the Jew. The 
Shape of Things to Come confirms the latter interpretation in a number of 
ways. Pinning down the Jewish sense of exceptionalism to their religion, 
Wells describes the Jew as ‘a breach in the collective solidarity everywhere 
... One could never tell whether a Jew was being a citizen or whether he 
was being just a Jew’ (STC, pp. 376–7). To that end, the World State is 
devised to rectify the Jew’s peculiarities ‘in the food of either of his body 
or his mind’ (STC, p. 377). This arrangement is expected to engender a 
complete solidarity of the world, rendered by Wells as being ‘full as ever it 
was of men and women of Semitic origin, but they belong no more to 
                                                 
29 Desmond King and Randall Hansen, ‘Experts at Work: State, Social Learning 
and Eugenic Sterilization in 1930s Britain,’ British Journal of Political Science 19 
(1999), p. 85. 
30 Peter Weingart, ‘Eugenic Utopias—Blueprints for the Rationalization of Human 
Evolution,’ Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia, ed. 
Everett Mendelsohn and Helga Nowotny, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984), p. 184. 
31 Ibid. 
32 H. G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress 
upon Human Life and Thought [1901], (London: Chapman and Hall, 1914), p. 316. 
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“Israel”’ (STC, p. 378). Although some of the conceptual premises of the 
eugenic legislation in Nazi Germany and Wells’s support for respective 
practices sound worryingly homologous, there is clearly—crude as it may 
sound—a difference between the educational coercion of the Jews in the 
World State and their physical extermination in the Holocaust. There is 
also an undeniable difference of degree between the Mental Deficiency Act 
in England and the Eugenic Law in Germany, to say nothing of their 
subsequent applications. These differences, to use Stone’s classification, 
fall into two categories: a ‘theoretical and ideational background’, and 
‘action’. So long as eugenic ideas did not fully cross the boundary between 
theory and practice in England, they have been interpreted as ‘the extremes 
of Englishness’.33 To use this conciliatory and largely normative logic, 
Wells’s conception of the Utopian double may be made to seem nearly un-
English. Because Wells negotiates the Utopian double on the basis of 
eugenic practices, his conception, at least retrospectively, occurs in the 
margins of the contemporary constructions of England. 
 
Wells’s other writings on the theme of a World State further 
demonstrate his consistent adherence to eugenic principles, but with one 
noteworthy peculiarity. As Chesterton insightfully concedes, ‘if I were 
restricted, on grounds of public economy, to giving Mr Wells only one 
medal ob cives servatos, I would give him a medal as the Eugenist who 
destroyed Eugenics’.34 Chesterton explains his commendation by the 
challenge that Wells presented to the eugenicists as early as Mankind in the 
Making (1903), in which he questioned the inheritance of health. Since 
health is not a quality but a balance, its breeding in the course of parental 
selection proves impracticable. Perhaps Wells’s attention to this legitimate 
challenge eventually allowed him to project ‘a different animal’ in the 
citizen of the Modern State, who had emerged ‘from the honest application 
of the Obvious to health, education, and economic organization, within 
little more than a hundred years’ (STC, p. 322). Aside from these measures, 
Wells enforces an ethical limit beyond which the creation of the Utopian 
double may be accomplished solely by educational means. As a caveat, 
Wells proceeds to conclude in The Work, Wealth and Happiness of 
Mankind: ‘The deliberate improvement of man’s inherent quality is at 
present unattainable. It is to a better education and to a better education 
alone, therefore, that we must look for any hope of ameliorating 
substantially the confusions and distresses of our present life’35. This 
                                                 
33 Stone, p. 4. 
34 Chesterton, p. 70. 
35 Wells, Work, pp. 679–80. 
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conclusion echoes Wells’s views on the role of a fair education discussed 
above, and ties into the ethical foundations of his idea of the ‘artificial 
factor’. 
 
In his study of Wells’s Cosmopolis, John Partington traces the idea of 
the ‘artificial factor in man’ to T. H. Huxley’s conception of ethical 
evolution. Even though T. H. Huxley distinguished the ‘cosmic process’, 
which permits the fittest to survive, from ‘social progress’ that favours 
‘those who are ethically the best’, he did not consider these two factors in 
opposition.36 As Partington clarifies, ‘not only is “ethical man” the result of 
natural evolution, but humanity’s use of ethics to tame the “cosmic 
process” is also a part of nature’.37 Along these lines, Wells’s aspirations 
for the improvement of humanity, either biological or social, target the 
‘artificial factor in man’ and are not ethically at variance with natural 
evolution. In The Shape of Things to Come, the narrator Dr Philip Raven 
supplies a most valid confirmation of this theory: a citizen of the World 
State is presented to be ‘less gregarious in his instincts and less suggestible 
… but he is far more social and unselfish in his ideology and mental habits. 
He is, in fact, for all the identity of his heredity, a different animal. He is 
bigger and stronger, more clear-headed, with more self-control and more 
definitely related to his fellow creatures’ (STC, pp. 408–9). Because this 
profile of the Utopian double is focused on attitudinal and mental 
characteristics, it makes little use of heredity. Whereas the betterment of 
man’s physical qualities originates from parental selection and breeding the 
defective out, ideology and mentality at large can only be the outcomes of 
education. 
 
Because Wells’s reservations concerning the use of eugenic methods 
are not rare, his vision of a World State is in conflict about education and 
heredity. Even though education and eugenics reinforce each other in his 
conception of the Utopian double, Wells repeatedly stresses the need of an 
education that would guarantee fair provisions. In an essay on eugenic 
thinking, Partington fully rehabilitates Wells the eugenicist, who, afflicted 
by a knowledge of the death camps operating in Central Europe during the 
Second World War, was forced ‘to reject [eugenics] out of hand’.38 
                                                 
36 T. H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics [1893], in T. H. Huxley and Julian Huxley, 
Evolution and Ethics, 1893–1943, (London: The Pilot Press, 1947), p. 81. 
37 John S. Partington, Building Cosmopolis: The Political Thought of H. G. Wells, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 28. 
38 John S. Partington, ‘H. G. Wells’s Eugenic Thinking of the 1930s and 1940s,’ 
Utopian Studies 14.1 (2003), p. 79. 
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However, if the Utopian double is to epitomize fairness, being both just and 
beautiful, his identity is inextricable not only from the idiom of the English 
character, but also from the contemporary national conundrum: during the 
interwar years, eugenics and education continued to exchange discursive 
energies. 
 
 
2. Utopian Individuality and the Crowd 
 
Both Men Like Gods and The Shape of Things to Come promote 
individuality. Because Wells’s vision of a World State forbids anyone 
without an individualizing distinction, it becomes an onus for a Utopian to 
study and work hard, in order to develop in several directions, like a 
polymath. Thus, Crystal, a thirteen-year-old youth, apart from majoring in 
natural sciences and mathematics, ‘is reading history in a holiday stage of 
his education’ (MLG, p. 372). The Shape of Things to Come complements 
this understanding of individuality: ‘We do not suppress individuality; we 
do not destroy freedom; we destroy obsessions and remove temptations. 
The world is still full of misleading doctrines, dangerous imitations and 
treacherous suggestions, and it is the duty of government to erase these’ 
(STC, p. 347). However, some Wellsian scholars are prone to question the 
theoretical foundations and practical implications of individuality in 
Wells’s writings. Parrinder and Partington are unanimous in arguing that 
Wells rejected liberal individualism,39 while Carey suggests that with time 
‘Wells began to doubt not only whether individuality could be allowed but 
whether it existed at all’40. 
 
The individuality of the Utopian double may be read as a reaction 
against the theory and practice of laissez-faire, which had its roots in free 
trade and later came to refer to governmental non-involvement in the 
domestic economy and other social spheres. The Utopian double, 
conceived in Wells’s utopias, notably contests laissez-faire, which is 
implicated in the Spencerian formula of ‘the survival of the fittest’. In The 
Shape of Things to Come, the project of a regulated capitalism, set forth by 
J. M. Keynes, one of the leading economists of the time, is viewed as being 
insufficient, despite the fact that it wins ‘an increased adherence’ (STC, p. 
249). Indeed, in his polemical pamphlet The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), 
Keynes gives vent to his deep concern about the precepts of laissez-faire 
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individualism: ‘It is not a correct deduction from the Principle of 
Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public 
interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened’.41 
Alongside individual enterprise, which, as Keynes believes, cannot be 
abolished unless it fails to deliver, the state should be permitted to take 
over ‘those things which at present are not done at all’.42 The Keynesian 
compromise instigates state control over unemployment and labour, 
savings and investment, as well as population. Regardless of Keynes’s 
opposition to the expansion of laissez-faire, Wells censures these proposals 
as an attempt at safeguarding ‘some existing political system by all sorts of 
artificial barriers and restraints from the world at large, in order to develop 
[a] peculiar system within its confines’ (STC, p. 249). 
 
Conversely, in Men Like Gods, the Utopian system of controls 
displaces ‘a limited and legalized struggle of men and women to get the 
better of one another’, and sanctions the ‘idea of creative service’ (MLG, 
pp. 249–50). In the eyes of Rupert Catskill, this transition can only end in 
degeneration, once competitive forces are withdrawn from social 
interaction. Yet Catskill’s opinion is found to be exclusively reliant on 
factors external to the actual process of competition. As Urthred contends, 
‘it is not true that competition has gone from our world … everyone here 
works to his or her utmost—for service and distinction … There is no way 
but knowledge out of the cages of life’ (MLG, p. 269). True, the transition 
from laissez-faire to the Utopian type of individualism is paradoxically 
based on the totality of state intervention, which Wells promotes in The 
Shape of Things to Come: ‘Never before was man so directed and 
disciplined’ (STC, p. 392). But on the way to the further realization of a 
World State, the role of the state diminishes, and creative service allows 
immediate occasions for the expression of individuality; in Men Like Gods, 
Barnstaple observes: 
 
And down there under the blue haze of the great plain almost 
all those who were not engaged in the affairs of food and 
architecture, health, education and the correlation of activities, 
were busied upon creative work; they were continually 
exploring the world without or the world within, through 
scientific research and artistic creation. They were continually 
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42 Ibid., p. 47. 
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adding to their collective power over life or to the realized 
worth of life. (MLG, p. 311) 
 
The Utopians’ professional occupations afford additional insight into the 
practice of individualism. Some of the Utopians, with whom the Earthlings 
interact, represent certain departments of knowledge to which their society 
attaches importance. Barnstaple remarks: ‘Everyone was doing work that 
fitted natural aptitudes and appealed to the imagination of the worker. 
Everyone worked happily and eagerly—as those people we call geniuses 
do on our Earth’ (MLG, p. 374). As a specialist in physio-chemistry, 
Serpentine explains the theories of ‘space-and-time universes, parallel to 
one another and resembling each other’ (MLG, p. 236). Cedar works as a 
cytologist, running an improvised sanatorium where the Earthlings are 
quarantined in order to prevent the epidemic from spreading (MLG, p. 
318). Urthred’s expert areas include ethnology and history. These 
competences allow Urthred to trace the development of humanity into a 
Utopian race whose progress hinges on the applications of the will. 
 
The Utopians understand will as key to harnessing nature, whose 
actions they see as illogical, ruthless and incompetent. In Urthred’s words, 
nature ‘made us by accident; all her children are bastards—undesired; she 
will cherish or expose them, pet or starve or torment without rhyme or 
reason’. In order to combat nature’s adverse and whimsical conduct, the 
Utopians rely on their will ‘to learn it and cease to fear it, to know it and 
comprehend it and master it’ (MLG, p. 270). The mastering of nature by the 
force of will governs the most ambitious cosmological interventions, to 
which Sungold, probably the oldest Utopian with whom Barnstaple holds 
conference, refers as ‘no more than a beginning’ of a ‘Life of which you 
and I are but anticipatory atoms and eddies, life will awaken indeed, one 
and whole and marvellous, like a child awaking to conscious life’ (MLG, p. 
396). The continuously expanding horizons of the Utopian endeavour are 
signalled by the vocabulary that describes an existence on the threshold of 
a higher order of reality. Where the Utopians aspire to reach the stars and 
other planets through their constant applications of the will, for Barnstaple 
the will promises a plausible passage of humanity to Utopia: ‘“Given the 
will,” said Mr Barnstaple. “Given the will.”. . .’ (MLG, p. 403). Being an 
active force in Utopia, the will is also associated with power. In her 
dissenting evaluation, Lychnis equates her fellow Utopians’ projects with 
the following aspirations: 
 
Sydney Studies                                                H.G. Wells’s Interwar Utopias 
 
36 
 
They have changed a wild planet of disease and disorder into a 
sphere of beauty and safety. They have made the wilderness of 
human motives bear union and knowledge and power. 
 
And research never rests, and curiosity and the desire for more 
power and still more power consumes all our world. (MLG, p. 
368) 
 
Engrossed in the study of compassion, a quality almost completely 
absent from the Utopian society, Lychnis laments the staggering lack of 
emotion. In a conversation, Barnstaple learns about her nephew: ‘Crystal, 
Utopian youth, was as hard as his name. When he had slipped one day on 
some rocks and twisted and torn his ankle, he had limped but he had 
laughed’ (MLG, p. 387). By the same token, death, should it be confronted 
fearlessly, is the cause of gladness, not sympathy. Falling out with such 
sentiments, Lychnis discerns overhuman qualities in the Utopians’ 
impregnable psychology. Such a forsworn capacity for self-pity and 
empathy, coupled with relentless yearnings for the stars, suggests 
equivalences with Friedrich Nietzsche’s projection of the overman in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885). The immediate impact of Nietzsche on 
Wells’s utopianism is a largely contestable and unexplored area. In a recent 
monograph on the early fiction of Wells, Steven MacLean has ascribed the 
scorn for ‘universal morality’, which characterizes Griffin in The Invisible 
Man (1897), to ‘a possible Nietzschean influence’.43 This declaratory 
remark, interesting in itself, requires further critical analysis on the level of 
textual evidence and Wells’s direct responses to Nietzsche. Always intent 
on ‘overcoming itself’, the overman, like the Utopians in Men Like Gods, is 
goal-oriented and presents the pinnacle of mankind’s ascent from the 
depths.44 These textual homologies are in direct correspondence with G. B. 
Shaw’s earlier vindication of the overman. In his preface to Major Barbara 
(1907), Shaw tellingly disowns ‘the despotism of a single Napoleonic 
Superman’.45 Instead, he sees sense in Nietzsche’s promotion of the 
overman as ‘the modern objection to Christianity’, the latter being ‘a 
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(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 84. 
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra [1883–85], trans. Adrian Del Caro, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 89. 
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pernicious slave morality’.46 In The World of William Clissold (1926), 
Wells further registers the contemporary perceptions of Nietzsche’s ideas: 
 
Neither Nietzsche’s Overman nor Shaw’s Superman was really 
to be thought of as an individual person. Both were plainly the 
race development, the whole race in progress. But writers with 
the journalistic instinct to capture got hold of these ideas and 
cheapened them irremediably, and the popular interpretation of 
these phrases, the Overman and the Superman, had come to be 
not a communion of saints but an entirely ridiculous individual 
figure, a swagger, a provocative mingling of Napoleon 
Bonaparte, Antinous, and the Admirable Crichton.47 
 
Just as William Clissold reacts against a denigration of the allegedly useful 
concept of the overman, Wells apparently holds Nietzsche in reasonably 
high esteem. In a letter of 21 February 1922, urging the editors of several 
literary journals to publish a complete edition of Leo Tolstoy’s works in 
English, Wells commends Nietzsche, alongside Richard Wagner and 
Henrik Ibsen, as ‘three giants’: without them ‘the XIX century bookshelf of 
our national libraries’ would have been incomplete.48 
 
However, Wells’s paramount acknowledgement of Nietzsche and his 
philosophy as a break-through in conceptualizing mankind’s progress takes 
exception to the principles of morality exercised by the Utopians. In Men 
Like Gods, the conception of the Utopian double is interlaced not only with 
overhuman qualities, but also with responsibility. Thus, Crystal points 
Barnstaple’s attention to the existence of latent frustrations and agonies that 
the Utopians have learnt to muster: ‘There is plenty of spite and vanity in 
every Utopian soul. But people speak very plainly and criticism is very 
searching and free. So that we learn to search our motives before we praise 
or question’ (MLG, p. 383). The practice of enquiry into one’s own motives 
sets a universal moral benchmark which steers the will towards perfecting 
individuality. Furthermore, in The Shape of Things to Come, Wells defines 
individuality as ‘a responsible part of a species. It has become an 
experiment in feeling, knowing, making and response’ (STC, p. 423). This 
definition shapes the Utopian double, enabling a complete change of 
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sensibilities and mediating an antidote to those irresponsible individuals 
who, in retrospect, hampered the rise of the World State. Undergirded by 
the discourse of responsibility, the Utopian double’s individuality outgrows 
the predominantly overhuman implications. At the same time, this version 
of individualism seems to be uniform and bland; the Utopians’ 
characterless light-heartedness is endorsed with a ‘broad’ and ‘pleasant’ 
smile typical of Urthred, Cedar and Sungold (MLG, pp. 242, 319, 389). 
Moreover, the demise of Serpentine and Cedar in the battle with the 
Earthlings, which in essence means the loss of two highly qualified 
scientists, is not duly recalled or remembered. This attitude not only 
confirms the Utopians’ understanding of death, which is never to be 
bemoaned, but it also implies the ordinariness of each allegedly unique 
Utopian who can so remorselessly be dispensed with.49 If ‘men like gods’ 
are conceived of as individuals whose character manifests itself in their 
collective work, how are they different from the crowd? 
 
In Wells’s interwar utopias, the crowd stands in conceptual opposition 
to the Utopian double. While conversing with Crystal in Men Like Gods, 
Barnstaple recollects images from ‘the world of the Crowd, the world of 
that detestable crawling mass of un-featured, infected human beings’ 
(MLG, p. 385). Crystal in turn assures Barnstaple that ‘[t]here are no more 
Crowds in Utopia. Crowds and the crowd-mind have gone for ever’ (MLG, 
p. 385). Having witnessed the irrational and barely controllable behaviour 
of crowds, Barnstaple associates them with mass gatherings and 
celebrations, like sport, war demonstrations, coronations, and public 
funerals. The protagonist’s critical assessment of the crowd phenomenon is 
redolent of the social trends in England’s national life in the early twentieth 
century. According to H. Cunningham, changes in the social dynamic 
                                                 
49 In the ‘Memorandum’ that prefaces Things to Come: A Film Story Based on the 
Material Contained in His History of the Future The Shape of Things to Come 
(1935), Wells stipulates that ‘[m]en will not be reduced to servitude and uniformity, 
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to Come [1935], intro. Allan Asherman and George Zebrowski, (Boston: Gregg 
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became acutely visible with the growing circulation of newspapers and a 
notable increase in the popularity of football matches, seaside resorts and 
admissions to the cinema.50 On all such occasions, the number of 
consumers had risen in geometric progression by 1939. Earlier on, Gustave 
Le Bon, one of the first critics of the crowd, connected the pervasiveness of 
crowds in his time to the enfranchisement of the working classes and 
exhorted that ‘[t]he age we are about to enter will in truth be the era of 
crowds’.51 Since Utopia has distanced itself, both temporally and mentally, 
from the era to which Le Bon referred, the crowd phenomenon re-emerges 
solely on cinematographic film, designated in Men Like Gods for 
educational purposes. 
 
In The Shape of Things to Come, the crowd and the crowd-mind 
figure in tandem with the growth of the World State. Wells follows gradual 
transformations in the make-up of crowds, which initially acquire a 
military element, then become ‘a medley of uniforms’ (STC, p. 50), and 
finally develop ‘candid interested faces’ (STC, p. 188). Despite this 
somewhat favourable improvement on the characteristics of crowds, Wells 
disparages the group sentiment that unites them; that is, crowds may act, 
when terror- or panic-stricken, ‘like madmen, all formations and 
distinctions lost’ (STC, p. 65). Apart from this, Wells registers a pseudo-
democratic malaise of the period, which presupposes the treatment of the 
electorate as a mere crowd of ‘prejudiced voters’ holding manipulated 
opinions (STC, p. 116). Most importantly, in the context of 1930s Europe, 
Wells suggestively comments on the propensity of crowds to form an 
alliance with dictators who offer an ‘imaginative refuge … from hard and 
competent aristocracy’ (STC, p. 333). Wells is alert to the danger of crowds 
ruling against individuality. On this note, his critique resonates with José 
Ortega y Gasset’s condemnation of the masses as a threat to the order of 
civilization. In The Revolt of the Masses (1930), Ortega, to whom Wells 
dedicated The Shape of Things to Come, voiced serious concern about the 
qualities of the average man that result from the levelling of incomes, 
culture, social classes, and sexes. Ortega further asserted that the masses 
were capable of ruling through the state, whose power might become 
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embodied in a dictatorship erasing ‘everything eminent’.52 In an attempt to 
prevent crowds from gaining power, Wells eventually restricts their 
presence to pictorial depictions in the Modern State, which is a practice 
similar to preserving their images on cinematographic film in Utopia. In 
The Shape of Things to Come, the narrator observes: ‘The notebooks … 
contain sketches of various members of the Council and some brilliant 
impressions of crowd effects in the main pavilion’ (STC, p. 371). The 
aforesaid notebooks happen to belong to the local artist and poet 
Theotocopulos, who stands out as a non-conformist and is therefore 
extremely individualistic. 
 
This latter connection of dissidence and individualism creates a 
palpable tension between Wells’s disavowal of the crowd as a mainstay of 
irrational behaviour and its arguable validity for questioning authority. 
Theotocopulos’s dissenting nature is given a socio-political prominence in 
the script of Things to Come (1935), as he continues to challenge the 
progress that incessantly limits human freedom and precludes the joys of 
living in the here and now: ‘Is man never to rest, never to be free? A time 
will come when they will want more cannon fodder for their Space Guns 
… Make an end to Progress now … Between the dark past of history and 
the incalculable future let us snatch today—and live’.53 But this conflicting 
campaign, charged with Luddite overtones, is later presented as a platform 
for the haphazard activity of the crowd: ‘The crowd hesitates … re-entering 
the city, in a straggling aimless manner, and pausing ever and again to stare 
at the sky’.54 In these scenes, the crowd emerges as a de-individualized 
riposte to the social order. Followed by a featureless mob, Theotocopulos 
contests the major scientific enterprise of space exploration with his 
reactionary attitudes. Notably, in The Shape of Things to Come, Wells 
mentions the protagonist’s ‘anarchistic soul’ in one breath with the latter’s 
objections to state intervention into ‘private flying, the difficulties in 
finding scope for his genius, and the general want of beauty and 
graciousness in life’ (STC, p. 363). Indeed, Theotocopulos is shown to be 
atavistically disposed to a bucolic past. His disposition is made to contrast 
unfavourably with the Utopian type of cooperative individualism, corrected 
by responsibility. 
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However, the presence of crowds as occasions for mass mobilization 
suggests that Wells’s investment in the triumph of scientific progress is not 
absolute, which reaffirms an underlying connection between Utopian 
individualism and the crowd. This link can be expounded by contemporary 
discussions of the national character that manifests itself in the crowd 
phenomenon. In the interwar years, the social situations, which tended to 
assemble crowds, permitted people to find ‘their identities both 
individually and collectively’ in activities outside religion.55 Besides, Gary 
Cross and John Walton emphasize, in their book on the geographies of 
pleasure, that the mind-set of crowds ‘reflects less the refinement and 
manipulation of the masses, than the triumph of particular strands of 
middle-class and “respectable” popular culture’.56 In this light, considering 
that a dominant ‘respectable’ culture in Wells’s utopias is represented by 
technical and scientific elites, the crowd mind is a necessary extension of 
the Utopian double. Therefore the revolt of the crowd against technological 
progress indicates a deep uncertainty which can equally, if covertly, beset 
the elites. Much as Cabal unequivocally opts for ‘conquest after conquest, 
to the stars’, when the crowd is unable to abort the launch of a space gun in 
Things to Come, he never orders Theotocopulos to be suppressed, no 
matter how outspoken the latter’s castigation of progress sounds. So long 
as the dissenters, such as Lychnis and Theotocopulos, are allowed to 
critique their respective societies, the crowd provides additional, albeit 
regressive, opportunities for free discussion. The fact that the crowd is 
brought back to life on film in Men Like Gods and in Theotocopulos’s 
notebooks in The Shape of Things to Come, to say nothing of its active role 
in Things to Come, closely follows a contemporary England of ever 
changing susceptibilities that Wells proposes to acknowledge and re-
educate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The conception of the Utopian double traverses Wells’s long-term project 
of bettering humanity by social and biological means, and by balancing out 
challenges to individuality. Immersed in a properly managed and fully 
accessible system of education, the Utopian double’s character is fostered 
in the tradition of fairness that springs from the national emphasis on fair 
play as an active strategy in the Englishman’s life. Alongside eugenics, the 
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overhuman qualities of the Utopian double’s physique and character 
equally signal Wells’s steady interest in revitalizing the nation (and 
humanity at large). Having rejected laissez-faire, Wells invests 
individualism in the functional aspect of a progress-oriented World State. 
In depicting potential opposition to progress, he nevertheless designates the 
crowd as both a dissenting agency and a critical corrective to Utopian 
individualism. This ambivalence suggests Wells’s underlying uncertainty 
about the forms in which residual attachments to England may be allowed 
to survive in a rational World State. 
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